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Abstract 
The article in review, “The Korean Nuclear Imbroglio: 
Can India be a Muted Spectator?”, written by Sitakanta 
Mishra, brings to light the strategic environment of the 
region of North Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The 
region in question is increasingly characterised, for good 
reasons, by the impact it has to endure due to the 
nuclearisation of North Korea. Efforts to denuclearise 
North Korea has only, till now, achieved nothing more 
than a stalemate. This has raised concerns all over the 
world as North Korea progresses in the path of 
nuclearisation under the direction of an authoritarian 
regime to which the world has limited access. At a time, 
such as this, it is impractical to focus on approaches to 
manage the crisis without properly understanding and 
recognising North Korea’s security concerns which 
prompted it to become a nuclear power. Only after 
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grasping the full picture should the focus be on how to 
contain North Korea when it is engaging in activities 
which reflects an increase in its nuclear capabilities, 
thereby challenging the preservation of stability in not 
only the region of North Asia but the whole of Asia and 
the world. The strategic environment in the region is 
largely dictated by the dynamics of deterrence employed 
by both U.S-ROK and North Korea, which may have 
contributed to the ongoing crisis. The article then 
proceeds to highlight the need for a reevaluation of the 
Korean crisis from a non-western standpoint. Sitakanta 
Mishra attempts to usher in an Asian nation’s perspective 
by raising an important question as to what role should 
India, being a nuclear power itself and an aspiring 
superpower, play in this strategic narrative to resolve the 
worrisome nuclear crisis of North Korea.  
Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear 
Proliferation, Nuclear Strategy, Denuclearization, Détente, North 
Korea, Korean Peninsula 
Introduction 
With secrecy clouding the North Korean regime in general and its 
role in enhancing deterrence vis-à-vis nuclear weapons program in 
any nascent nuclear weapon state, it is quite difficult to assert the 
accurate nuclear capability of the country. However, going by the 
sources, it is believed that the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea still appears to be a meagre nuclear power, with 
approximately 20 to 30 warheads and enough fissile material to 
construct further 30 to 60 nuclear weapons (Bandow, 2020). Even 
though North Korea displays a moderate nuclear capability, its 
nuclearisation has brought several implications for the region and 
the world in general. Two immediate concerns emerge out of 
Pyongyang’s arming. First, North Korea’s nuclear development 
undermines the state of deterrence and stability in the Korean 
Peninsula, with the risks of North Korea, emboldened by its 
possession of nuclear weapons, to launch an attack on the Republic 
of Korea (ROK), which will then put USA’s concept of extended 
deterrence to the test (Lee D. S., 2008). The need to strengthen the 




alliance in the region to counter North Korea’s crisis is not new. 
Simultaneously, the nature of extended deterrence itself is a highly 
contested topic. There have been no such grave scenarios where it 
has been put to use. Hence, one does not know whether it will be 
rightly followed as proclaimed. This then brings added 
complications to the region. The second concern flows from the 
first, i.e. the more North Korea arms itself alongside the concern of 
growing disbelief in extended deterrence, ROK and Japan may try 
to obtain their own nuclear deterrents. This will only set off a chain 
of proliferation, leading to a new set of concerns (Lee D. S., 
2008)(Mishra, 2018).  
A longstanding approach to the North Korean crisis has been to 
pressurise the state through economic sanctions and by refusing to 
accept it as a nuclear-weapon state. This was only done keeping in 
mind one objective that is of denuclearisation. However, to 
understand if North Korea is at all ready to accept this process, the 
article focuses on a historical exposition to highlight a 
fundamentalquestion as to why North Korea needs its nuclear 
arsenal.  
2. Going Back to the Base 
The article highlights that the fundamental cause of the problem 
can be traced back to the days of the Cold War and the Korean War 
(Mishra, 2018). America’s enthusiasm toward intervention appears 
to be a significant trigger to the North Korean crisis that followed. 
Following the North’s invasion of the South in 1950, only 
immediate intervention by the U.S.was able to bar further conquest 
by Kim Il Sung (Bandow, 2020). China, in response, sent help in the 
form of hundreds and thousands of troops to assist its neighbour 
(Bandow, 2020) and the war came to an end with an armistice 
agreement and not with a peace agreement in 1953 (Bandow, 2020) 
(Mishra, 2018)(Waxman, 2018). The Korean War was the first event 
that sowed the seeds in the North Korean leadership’s mindof the 
need to possess nuclear weapons. The news of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached the North by the returning 
Koreans who survived the attack and the U.S.nuclear threat that 
was employed to end the war with North Korea which for a fact 




did not possess any appropriate defence against these highly 
destructive weapons made the North Korean leadership feel the 
first blow of security deficit in the region (Bermudez Jr., 2015). This, 
in turn, contributed to the decision to take the necessary actions to 
develop its own nuclear deterrent. Alongside military security was 
the problem of economic security that grappled North 
Korea(Bermudez Jr., 2015) (Bandow, 2020). The end of the Cold 
War,North Korea found itself in several changes to the security 
environment. At the same time, North Korea faced a new set of 
security concerns generated by the loss of its major military 
backers(Bandow, 2020). The circumstances generated by a post-
Mao transformation of China and the collapse of Soviet Union 
(Bandow, 2020),together with DPRK’s economic stagnation 
compelled the North to resort to a self-help strategy by introducing 
the Songun ‘Military First’ policy during the 1990s (Mishra, 2018) 
and by taking steps to exploit the political and diplomatic benefit of 
nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty (Bermudez Jr., 
2015)(Vaddi, 2018).  
Another major issue during the Cold War that contributed to the 
North’s need to possess nuclear weapons was the thousands of 
U.S.nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea and the joint 
military exercises that the allies paraded in the region(Vaddi, 2018) 
(Mishra, 2018). Although North Korea’s nuclear ambition was set in 
motion by the 1990s, North Korea indulged in certain diplomatic 
ventures to stabilise the crisis in hand. The first of such was an 
attempt made by the then Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, to introduce 
the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula 
(Mishra, 2018). This attempt did not receive deserving attention at 
the time. It was only until U.S.President George W. Bush withdrew 
all U.S.nuclear weapons from South Korea (Mishra, 2018). The step 
forward for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula was 
undertaken in the form of signing the 1992 Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, it failed due 
to North Korea’s loss of confidence on South Korea as the latter still 
enjoyed security assurances under the U.S.nuclear umbrella and a 
disagreement between the North and the U.S.over the scope of the 
IAEA inspections (Mishra, 2018). Another attempt was made by 
signing the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994, under 




which North Korea decided to renounce its nuclear ambition in 
exchange for aid U.S., Japan, South Korea through the KEDO 
project (Mishra, 2018). However, that too failed as post 9/11 the 
U.S.released its annual Nuclear Posture Review in which North 
Korea was grouped with other states under the category ‘axis of 
evil’ (Mishra, 2018). Not only did the 1994 diplomatic step fall 
through, but a significant diplomatic set back also emerged as 
North Korea withdrew itself from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) in 2003 (Mishra, 2018)(Khan, 2016). Bilateral 
diplomacy with the U.S.did not seem to pay off that well, and 
neither did multilateral initiatives as was witnessed in the Six-Party 
Talks negotiations (Khan, 2016)(Mishra, 2018). What followed then 
was a series of provocative events initiated by an autocratic North 
(Mishra, 2018), which can be viewed through the lens of stability-
instability paradox, inviting economic sanctions for itself.  
North Korea’s need to possess nuclear weapons is majorly driven 
by the situation it finds itself in. Failed diplomatic ventures, 
struggling economy coupled with a superpower presence (Mishra, 
2018) in the Korean peninsula contributed to the security deficit 
experienced by North Korea. Not only did South Korea’s economy 
surged ahead, the security guarantee it enjoyed from the 
U.S.characterised a major section of the regional security dynamic. 
The justification employed for the U.S.extended deterrence 
provided to South Korea was to stop South Korea from considering 
having its own deterrent to prevent proliferation, which would 
have had a more destabilising impact on the region (Mishra, 2018). 
In contrast, the intensity of the alliance between North Korea and 
China was not enough to balance the US-ROK alliance in the 
region(Mishra, 2018). Alongside these triggers, the prior examples 
set by U.S.interventions in other states that (Mishra, 2018) appeared 
to be at odds with it guide the North Korean regime to seek refuge 
in the utility of nuclear weapons for regime survival. This line of 
thinking is born out of awareness on North Korea’s part of the 
conventional imbalance it faces to prevent any U.S.intervention or 
preemption. Also, a fear that renouncing nuclear weapons would 
generate the same result as Qaddafi’s renouncement did make 
North Korea believe that it could not be safer without nuclear 
weapons (Bandow, 2020). Another event that shapes North Korea’s 




reliance on nuclear weapons is the U.S.intervention in Iraq. Had 
Saddam Hussain possessed nuclear weapons would the U.S.still 
proceed with the intervention? For North Korea, nuclear weapons 
provide them with a sense of security under the dynamics of 
deterrence which was not enjoyed by the regimes of Saddam and 
Qaddafi.  
An over-emphasis on denuclearisation of the peninsula until the 
2018 Singapore summit between President Donald Trump and Kim 
Jong Un did not procure any productive result. Grappling with 
economic sanctions and isolation, facing constant criticism of the 
North Korean state and its regime, and encountering a situation of 
security dilemma characterised by a sense of security deficit 
catalysed by a display of the US-ROK military alliance, are reasons 
used by the negotiators to validate that nuclear weapons feature as 
a necessity for the regime’s survival in North Korea’s security 
rhetoric. Deterrence plays a vitalrole in the manner in which it has 
shaped the region’s strategic environment. Even after diplomatic 
ventures, the strategic environment seems to be unpredictable due 
to North Korea’s history of duplicity and USA’s presence, 
characterised by the fact that this region features a rogue nuclear 
weapons state and the shadow of USA’s nuclear umbrella. 
3. The Centrality Assigned to Deterrence in the Region 
The article rightly captures the regional security environment, 
which reflects a state of predicament due to a North-South hostility, 
the dominant presence of the United States, China’s growing 
influence all of which became more complicated due to an added 
nuclear angle. Although mentioned briefly, the article could have 
highlighted the root cause of the problem in the region, i.e. an 
innate tendency to view every security aspect through the lens of 
deterrence in a better and a more in-depth manner.  The concept of 
deterrence indicates the use of a threat, explicit or otherwise, by 
one party to convince another party to uphold the status quo- is a 
phenomenon that is not bound by the confines of time and space 
(Zagare, 2006). This indicates that it is the use of threats to 
manoeuvre behaviour to prevent something unwanted from 
materialising. “. . . the prevention from action by fear of the 




consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the 
existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction” 
(Defense Dictionary, 1994). When analysing the role assigned to 
deterrence in the region, one particular thing becomes evident: 
deterrence is practised in both directions. In fact, from the very 
beginning, a US-ROK alliance has largely shaped the region’s 
security environment, which in itself is based on the very concept 
of deterrence.  
The article argues that the region of the Korean Peninsula got 
introduced to nuclear weapons by the USA during the Cold War 
(Mishra, 2018) as an effort to bolster deterrence. Although all U.S. 
nuclear weapons were removed from ROK after the Cold War 
ended, ROK still enjoys a military security assurance from the USA 
as part of the latter’s extended deterrence scheme as part of its 
efforts to prevent ROK from gaining its own nuclear capability and 
to curtail further proliferation in the region. Another explanation 
that can be employed to assess the USA’s dominant military and 
nuclear presence in the region is that the USA has its own strategic 
agenda in the region to balance China’s growing influence where 
China shares an alliance with DPRK and Russia, as well, happens 
to be a bordering nation. The United States and ROK sought to 
deter any North Korean assault on the former and also to deter 
lower-level provocations initiated by the latter (Roehrig, 2016). The 
United States’ obsession with deterrence is to the point, as rightly 
indicated by the article, that it readily disregarded any efforts made 
by North Korea in the direction of turning the region into 
NWFZ(Mishra, 2018) has largely contributed to the instability that 
this region currently demonstrates. In turn, Pyongyang’s 
deterrence strategy reflects an effort to deter a possible US-ROK 
(Roehrig, 2016) invasion or compliance to force regime change. Had 
this remained at the conventional level, DPRK did have the 
capability to deter a ROK invasion by maintaining a large 
conventional force that would have inflicted severe damage and 
increase the cost of an attack by the latter. However, since the 
inception of nuclear weapons and induction of them in the region, 
there has been a constant effort on North Korea’s part to expand its 
nuclear capability that can by now, reach all of South Korea and 
Japan, with continued efforts to reach the United States (Roehrig, 




2016). In contrast, efforts have been made to strengthen the United 
States’ concept of extended deterrence in the region and to put 
‘maximum pressure’ on DPRK to abandon its nuclear program.  
Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons may indicate its 
search for international prestige and political leverage. However, 
North Korea’s proclamations reflect deterrence to be the foremost 
purpose (Roehrig, 2016) (Mishra, 2018) (Bandow, 2020). Every 
nuclear advancement made by North Korea indicates that its 
minimal nuclear deterrence (Su, 2020)strategy is based on a more 
credible assured retaliation capability (Bermudez Jr., 2015).  
Credibility assumes the role of being the cornerstone of deterrence. 
As the question of- what is the use of capability if it cannot perform 
the function of deterring the adversary from attacking and 
destroying whole cities? - is raised- the importance of credibility as 
well as the inherent problem associated with it comes to the 
limelight. Governments often assumed that if it possessed the right 
capability and issued threats, the opponent would receive the 
message that it was trying to send. However, this soon seemed to 
be futile like several Cold War incidents. The threat the 
government is believed to be issuing has no credibility if: the other 
side possesses the same capabilities and is not deterred by the 
threat; if the other side is believed to be irrational in reading the 
threat and the will and intent associated with it (Morgan, 2003); or 
if the other side does not believe that the deterrer will actually 
implement its threat when the time comes because acting on it will 
not only begin a conflict but will also render severe fatalities on 
both sides and the deterrer might choose to concede as would be 
the rational choice in such situations. These issues highlighted the 
importance of not only maintaining capability but also of 
displaying the will and resolve to use them when the time comes. If 
the challenger is already aware that the deterrer will concede then 
whatever the threat maybe it will not be credible. This brings out 
the fundamental tenet that credibility rests on: belief. “Credibility is 
the quality of being believed” (Morgan, 2003). That is, a threat is 
indicated to be credible if it is believed (Schelling, 1966) 
(Quackenbush, 2011) (Morgan, 2003) (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985). 
The significance of communication is experienced now when the 




need arises to convince the opponent of not only possessing the 
said capabilities but also of the will and intent to use them if one’s 
interests are challenged. Initially, there was suspicion on both sides 
about the other’s military and nuclear capabilities when they solely 
relied on the declarations by each side. However, the burden of 
how much to convey and how much to believe eased but did not 
disappear with growth in the surveillance capabilities. Alongside, 
convincing the other side about one’s will and intent remained an 
issue. These concerns provided the basis for deterrence to embody 
an inherent credibility problem, one with several faces. With a 
ceaseless advancement in nuclear technology, there happens to be a 
constant need to take measurements to bolster deterrence by 
strengthening its credibility. The states then enter a “credibility 
spiral” by constantly focusing on developing more capabilities, 
which generates a dangerous tension level (Roehrig, 2016).  This 
particular trend indicates an intrinsic concern of an action-reaction 
syndrome which then, of course, leads to an arms race between the 
adversary and the last thing that any region requires for its stability 
is more weapons. For example, the induction of THAAD (Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea by the United States 
has resulted in North Korea responding by increasing its missile 
testing pace(Borrie, Caughley, & Wan, 2017). It has also received 
heavy criticism from China and Russia. Alongside this, is the issue 
of stability-instability paradox. The need to strengthen deterrence 
on U.S-ROK’s part is often justified on the grounds that North 
Korea indulges in lower-level provocations that have the potential 
to escalate. These lower-level provocations are explained with the 
help of stability-instability paradox, which maintains that nuclear 
weapons help to preserve stability at the strategic level, but it 
liberates the adversaries to engage in lower-level acts of 
provocation believing that neither side would want to escalate to a 
level where nuclear weapons might be employed. 
According to nuclear deterrence proponents, nuclear deterrence, a 
Cold War strategy, is still believed to be the only way to contain 
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, study the security environment, 
and stabilise the region (Borrie, Caughley, & Wan, 2017). However, 
to view the region’s asymmetric security concerns through the lens 
of nuclear deterrence, a concept that emerged to study the 




symmetric strategic relationship between the USA and the USSR 
(Borrie, Caughley, & Wan, 2017)(Roehrig, 2016), seems to be a 
wrong fit which then raises a number of concerns. First, to 
strengthen deterrence based on the stability-instability paradox 
argument only points to the direction that it is being employed to 
assess whether paradox predictions are precise. However, that fails 
to capture the essence, which is to establish which action meets the 
requirements of generating instability. The risk-taking behavior of 
the state happens to be an important variable here specially when 
talking about asymmetric relationships. In the North Korean case, 
according to Waltz, “the weaker and the more endangered a state 
is, the less likely it is to engage in reckless behavior. North Korea’s 
behavior has sometimes been ugly, but certainly not reckless. Its 
regime has shown no inclination to risk suicide”(Sagan & Waltz, 
2003)(Roehrig, 2016). Therefore, though North Korea engages in 
provocative actions, its risk-taking behaviour needs to be assessed 
as to whether it actually generates any form of instability before the 
United States takes further measures to justify the increase in its 
capability. Second, the relative lack of predictability of North 
Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, brings to light the contradictions of 
assuming rationality of the leader on which the concept of 
deterrence lies (Borrie, Caughley, & Wan, 2017). Third, the lack of 
transparency is extreme in the case of North Korea (Borrie, 
Caughley, & Wan, 2017) (Bandow, 2020) (Roehrig, 2016). This 
reflects a problem when deterrence rests upon assurance and 
reassurance to maintain stability.  
The need to strengthen extended deterrence and alliance between 
U.S-ROK is not new (Asia, 2019). However, any further step 
towards this direction will only brew more insecurity in North 
Korea, compelling it to act in a more destabilising fashion. The 
need of the hour is to reduce the circumstances under which the 
North might feel the need to resort to nuclear weapons (Bandow, 
2020). The U.S-ROK alliance should now focus less on how to 
constantly reinforce deterrence and more on how to make the 
situation such that it would encourage more dialogue and move 
towards détente. If the crisis continues to follow the same path, 
then soon faith in extended deterrence would fade, and demands 
for their own nuclear deterrent would emerge in South Korea and 




Japan as they are also facing an existential crisis due to North 
Korea’s nuclearisation. Traces of this demand have already 
emerged in South Korea (Bandow, 2020)(Lee B. C., 2019).  
All diplomatic ventures end in a stalemate because both sides’ 
demands are not being met. To contain North Korea, its demand of 
a lesser presence of the United States in the region is key. Whereas, 
the United States is consumed by its objective of initiating 
denuclearisation in the region. The security rhetoric in the region is 
largely guided by the presence of nuclear weapons due to the 
active role played by deterrence, and hence, an over-emphasis on 
denuclearisation of the North seems futile for several reasons. The 
need of the hour dictates is to shift the focus from denuclearisation 
to a way forward in the form of arms control (Bandow, 2020) that 
would help contain North Korea. 
 
4. India’s Role 
The article highlights a very important and necessary discussion 
that appears much prominently in the recognised Korean Peninsula 
security narrative. It calls attention to the implications of the 
ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis on India and argues how 
India should respond for the benefit of the latter’s strategic role. 
The article fairly identifies the strategic environment in the Korean 
Peninsula where attempts by the United States at making any 
diplomatic headway with North Korea has only ended in a 
stalemate (Mishra, 2018)(Bermudez Jr., 2015)(Bandow, 2020). Once 
analysed, the situation presents itself as one where a step taken 
towards détente has only brought more actions to reinforce 
deterrence. Diplomatic ventures between the United States and 
North Korea failed partly due to an overplay of deterrence in the 
region. In such circumstances, the article maintains that India 
believes that it is vital that India maintain a diplomatic presence in 
North Korea, which may prove beneficial for the United States to 
maintain communication (Mishra, 2018).  
The nuclear crisis of North Korea may not have a considerable 
effect on India. However, it links India directly to North Korea due 




to the significant concern of proliferation. India maintains an 
inflexible stance as an advocate of global non-proliferation 
(Pandey, 2017). Having said that India may choose to engage in the 
Korean Peninsula security rhetoric. The article argues that “India’s 
approach towards the Korean issues has been cautious and 
pragmatic” (Mishra, 2018). Cautious in the sense that India did, up 
until now, hesitate in assuming a third party role in negotiations 
(Pandey, 2017).However, it does not necessarily mean that India 
supports North Korea’s nuclear ambitions (Mishra, 2018). India has 
religiously voiced its criticism for each nuclear test by North Korea. 
It remains opposed to the latter’s proliferation activities, especially 
after acquiring knowledge of Pyongyang’s linkages with the illicit 
nuclear proliferation network based in Pakistan (Mishra, 2018) 
(Pandey, 2017). The revelation of the illegal A. Q. Khan network’s 
involvement in supplying materials for the North Korean nuclear 
program in 2004 has exposed a major concern vis-à-vis the state’s 
involvement in Khan’s activities (Pollack, 2012) as this posits a 
grave threat to non-proliferation initiatives. As mentioned earlier, 
there is a practical side to India’s relationship with North Korea. 
While it opposes North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, India has 
maintained a cordial relationship with North Korea on 
humanitarian grounds (Mishra, 2018). Although India suspended 
all trade transactions with North Korea, it has kept the channel of 
medical and food supplies to the latter open (Mishra, 2018) 
(Pandey, 2017).  
India’s engagement may have certain positive contributions to 
make in the resolution of the North Korean crisis. First, India is one 
of the largest trade partners of North Korea (Mishra, 2018) (Pandey, 
2017), an argument that India may employ to influence North 
Korea to curtail further developments in the latter’s nuclear 
program. India’s participation would also bring in a fresh non-
western perspective to the region’s security narrative as it would 
shift the focus from the United States’ obsession with the agenda of 
denuclearisation to an Asian country’s attempt at resolving the 
immediate crisis (Pandey, 2017). There are several valid reasons for 
India’s involvement. The first concern is that India’s influence in 
the region is significantly low. Arguing from a strategic point of 
view, if tensions between the United States and North Korea were 




to remain so or if a situation emerges where the influence of the 
U.S.in the region is diminished then India would have to think 
hard on what role it would play in reducing tensions in the region. 
In doing so, the first hurdle that India would have to overcome is to 
offset China’s ever-growing influence on North Korea (Mishra, 
2018). China may have a negative response to India’s involvement; 
however, the agenda of curtailing proliferation should act as the 
guiding force (Pandey, 2017). If the domino effect of proliferation 
occurs in the region then, as the article precisely indicates, “Asia 
would be the most crowded nuclear weapons” (Mishra, 2018), 
which will have implications globally.  
5. Conclusion 
The article accurately suggests that to take any action to resolve the 
crisis, it is extremely crucial to first understand the root cause of the 
problem by going back to its historical roots. An authoritarian 
regime with its nuclear brinkmanship presents a fragile situation 
which requires an appropriate balance between deterrence and 
détente. The article highlights, to a reasonable extent, the 
implications of a dominant presence of the United States in the 
region for North Korea. An overemphasis on the need to provide 
U.S extended deterrence to South Korea has instilled enough level 
of insecurity in North Korea that it has imbibed nuclear deterrence 
as the only instrument to guarantee its survival. The article 
criticises the United States’ agenda of denuclearisation as it appears 
to be misleading. The manner in which the United States is 
advocating the agenda of denuclearisation displays a lack of 
seriousness. Had this agenda been a priority for the United States, 
then much importance would have been given to strengthening 
détente and not deterrence. Although this article expresses its 
opinion against denuclearisation, it could delve deeper into the 
matter and discuss in a more elaborative manner as to why an 
obsession with this agenda is futile.  
 An excessive overplay of deterrence in the region has rendered it 
difficult for denuclearisation to occur given the current 
circumstances. Any measurement taken to strengthen deterrence 
presents a scenario where issuing threats, the basic instrument of 




deterrence, reflects a dedication to assembling nuclear arsenals, the 
occurrence of provocative actions taken by an uncertain and 
unpredictable Kim Jong Un’s leadership, and suggests the 
possibility of U.S. military actions. In such a scenario, nuclear 
weapons provide a range of incentives to North Korea including its 
very own survival. Hence, to talk of denuclearisation seems like a 
vain attempt as North Korea does not seem ready to relinquish its 
nuclear ambitions. As latest as of May 2020, Kim Jong Un presided 
over a meeting on “new policies for further increasing the nuclear 
war deterrence” (Bandow, 2020) where it was discussed that there 
is a need to increase North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (Gamel, 
2020). This certainly does not seem to be what Donald Trump 
believes that North Korea is ready to abandon its nuclear program. 
A change in the regions security narrative is immensely crucial at 
this point. As talks of denuclearisation are making no headway, the 
article argues that going forward the world needs to learn how to 
live with a nuclear North Korea and importance should now be 
given to arms control as that seems far more practical than the 
illusion of denuclearisation. The article rightly indicates that much 
of the literature and discourse on the security dynamics of the 
Korean Peninsula has been shaped by the United States’ rhetoric. 
By discussing India’s role, this article aims to revive the discourse 
with regional perspectives. The aftermath of the Korean crisis will 
have an adverse effect on South and East Asia in which case India 
cannot remain silent, and its engagement must be encouraged.  
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